Anatman

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Translations of
anatman
English no-self, not-self,
insubstantiality,
lack of inherent existence
Pali anattā, anatta
Sanskrit anātman, anatman
Chinese 无我
(Pinyinwúwǒ)
Japanese 無我
(rōmaji: muga)
Tibetan བདག་མེད་
(Wylie: bdag med;
THL: dakmé;
)

Anatman (Sanskrit, also: anātman; Pāli: anatta) is one of the key concepts in Buddhism, and a key factor that distinguished Buddhism from the other Indian religious traditions at the time of the Buddha. It is typically translated into English as "no-self" or "not-self", which is a literal translation of the Sanskrit/Pali term.

Most other traditions at the time of the Buddha believed in the concept of atman, which refers to a permanently existing "self" or "soul" that migrates from life to life. The Buddha rejected the concept of a permanent "self/soul", and instead asserted the concept of anatman (Pali: anatta), which refers to an impermanent, constantly changing, composite self. The Buddha asserted that what we think of as the "self/soul" is not one single permanent entity. Rather, what we call "self/soul" is a collection of constantly changing "heaps" or "aggregates". In the earliest teachings, the Buddha identified five specific heaps as the components of what we call "self". In later teachings, the Buddha identified other ways of breaking down our concept of self.

The Buddha asserted that this misunderstanding of the nature of self, which leads to all sorts of attachments and desires, is the primary cause of suffering for beings. Buddhism teaches that developing a correct understanding of the nature of self (and by extension everything in the universe), releases us from unnecessary attachment and thus leads to a decrease in suffering.

Anatman is identified as one of the three marks of existence, and it is key to understanding the truth of suffering within the four noble truths.

Within the Theravadan Pali Canon

The doctrine of anatta is found throughout the nikayas and presented in a number of different ways. In the anattalakkhana sutta, anatta is presented in the form of an argument, where the Buddha addresses anatta in relation to the five aggregates. A similar argument is made later in relation to the six sense bases.[1] The Buddha also develops anatta into one of the fetters, defining views of self and "I-making" as a form of ignorance, even stating that all views of self, no matter how clever, are always going to be based in ignorance.[2][3] It is also discussed in relation to dependent origination and presented as a counter to contemporary views that existed during the time of the Buddha.

Relationship to the five aggregates

The Buddhist terms anatta (Pāli) and anātman (Sanskrit) are used in the suttas to emphasize that phenomena are void of any quality of self. This includes the views that some things are self, contain a self, or otherwise belong to a self. The terms anicca (impermanence) and dukkha (imperfection) are often used in a similar manner, emphasizing that phenomena are impermanent and imperfect. Together, they represent the three marks of existence that describe all conditioned phenomena.

Not-self is a particularly important teaching in relation to liberation and is part of a common formula in the suttas that leads to enlightenment. By analyzing the characteristic of not-self as pervading all conditioned phenomena, one is said to become detached and then liberated. One example of this formula can be seen when Rādha asks about the meaning of anatta,

At Savatthi. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Rādha said to the Blessed One: "Venerable sir, it is said, 'nonself, nonself.' What now, venerable sir, is nonself?"

"Form, Rādha, is nonself, feeling is nonself, perception is nonself, volitional formations are nonself, consciousness is nonself.

"Seeing thus, Rādha, the instructed noble disciple experiences revulsion towards form, revulsion towards feeling, revulsion towards perception, revulsion towards volitional formations, revulsion towards consciousness. Experiencing revulsion, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion [his mind] is liberated. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: 'It's liberated.' He understands: 'Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.'" [4]

Rādha is later found asking the Buddha how he should know that I-making, mine-making, and the root of conceit (literally: "I am") have all been abandoned. The same formula is applied elsewhere in the suttas, with the question itself being asked a number of different times, and a number of different bhikkhus latter attaining enlightenment.

At Savatthi. Then the Venerable Rādha approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him:

"Venerable sir, how should one know, how should one see so that, in regard to this body with consciousness and in regard to all external signs, I-making, mine-making, and the underlying tendency to conceit no longer occur within?"

"Any kind of form whatsoever ... Any kind of feeling whatsoever ... Any kind of perception whatsoever ... Any kind of volitional formations whatsoever ... Any kind of consciousness whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near--one sees all consciousness as it really is with correct wisdom thus: 'This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.'

Then the Venerable Rādha ... by realizing it for himself with direct knowledge, in this very life ... became one of the arahants.[5]

Relationship to eternalism and annihilationism

While the concept of a soul (jiva) is distinct from the concept of a self (atta, ātman), certain doctrines concerning the soul are seen to contradict the notion of anatta.[6][7] Eternalism, or the idea that there is a soul distinct from the body, implies the existence of an eternal self, which the Buddha rejected. Annihilationism, or the idea that the soul and the body are the same, implies the existence of a temporary self that is later destroyed upon death, which the Buddha also rejected.

Views of self

The Buddha describes various additional views of self to be abandoned, in some cases naming them "thickets of views". Not only are the views "this is mine, this I am, this is my self" to be abandoned, but so are other views, such as "I will be", "I will be this", "I will be otherwise" etc. A few of the suttas[8][9] even see belief in no self as tied up with the belief in a self. Views of "denial", in the form "I am not this", or "I will not be that", are thus rooted in the same 'I am' attitude; even the view "I do not exist" arises from a preoccupation with 'I'.[10]

Identity-view as a fetter

Identity-view is defined as one of the fetters to be abandoned by the Buddha, and a requirement for stream entry. Only by removing notions of "self" and "I-making" is one able to attain liberation.

Anatta in dependent origination

When demanded that the Buddha address the question of “who”, as in “who feels”[11] or “who is born”,[12] he often responded with a description of dependent origination, stating that the question of “who” brings with it assumptions that are incorrect.[11]

Within the Mahāyāna tradition

There are many different views of Anatta (Chinese: 無我 wú-wǒ; Japanese: 無我 muga) within various Mahayana schools.

Prajnaparamita Sutras

While the nikayas take a fairly conservative approach to the teaching of not-self, trying to avoid being confused for nihilistic attitudes, the early Mahayana Prajnaparamita Sutras are more direct about it. In the Diamond Sutra, the Buddha says that while ordinary beings believe that there is an "I" or a self, the Buddha sees that there is no "I" or self. This means that when the Buddha liberates sentient beings, he is not really liberating anyone, because there are no beings to be liberated. [13]

Chán

Bodhidharma, who is regarded as the founder of Chan Buddhism in China, wrote in his Essence of Mahayana Practice that, "Sentient beings are without a self".[14] Bodhidharma sees belief in the self as an impurity, as corrupting the dharma, and leading to greed, anger, ignorance, pride, and other false views. Therefore he says that the dharma is "free from the impurities of self" and that acting in accordance with this view is "to act in accordance with the Dharma".

Nan Huaijin, a major figure in modern Chinese Buddhism and Chán, has criticized what he views as modern nihilistic interpretations of the doctrine of anatta. He has stated that these interpretations are "totally wrong", and likens them to philosophical materialism.[15] When discussing the Ten Forms of Mindfulness in the Āgamas, he mentions these interpretations of anatta:[16]

"When the Hīnayāna speaks of no self, it is in reference to the manifest forms of presently existing life; the intent is to alert people to transcend this level, and attain Nirvāṇa. But when this flowed into the world of learning, especially when it was disseminated in the West, some people thought that the Buddhist idea of no self was nihilism and that it denied the soul, and they maintained that Buddhism is atheistic. This is really a joke."

Madhyamaka

Napper[17] summarises and distinguishes a host of modern academic commentators and their views on anatta and the middle way philosophy; rather than enter into the many different modern hermeneutics the basic view on annata can be seen from the following commentators.

While commenting on Āryadeva, Candrakīrti defines anatta as follows:

Ātman is an essence of things that does not depend on others; it is an intrinsic nature. The non-existence of that is selflessness.

— Bodhisattvayogacaryācatuḥśatakaṭikā 256.1.7[18]

Buddhapālita adds, while commenting on Nagārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,

What is the reality of things just as it is? It is the absence of essence. Unskilled persons whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion conceive of an essence of things and then generate attachment and hostility with regard to them.

— Buddhapālita-mula-madhyamaka-vrtti P5242,73.5.6-74.1.2[18]

The 'essence' which is mentioned here is not merely refuting a self which is permanent, partless and independent, or a self that belongs to the views of other philosophies: While commenting on Candrakīrti, Tsongkhapa says:

If you fail to eradicate the perspective of innate ignorance, then, when you refute a personal self, you will only refute a self that is permanent, unitary and independent. When you refute an objective self you will only refute things that are imputed by the advocates of philosophical tenets. [...] It would be extremely absurd to claim that you can overcome innate afflictions by seeing as nonexistent the two selves implied by acquired misconceptions.

— Lam Rim Chen Mo, 646[18]

Regarding this, Candrakīrti says

When knowing selflessness, some eliminate a permanent self, but we do not consider this to be the basis of the conception of "I" It is therefore astonishing that knowing this selflessness expunges and uproots the view of self.

— Madhyamakāvatāra 6.140[18]

Anatta and moral responsibility

While the Buddha attacked the assumptions of existence of an eternal Self, he would refer to the existence of a conventional self-subject to conditional phenomena and responsible, in the causal-moral sense, for karma. Peter Harvey writes that according to the suttas,

It can thus be said that, while an empirical self exists - or rather consists of a changing flow of mental and physical states which neither unchangingly exists nor does not exist - no metaphysical Self can be apprehended.[19]

There are many statements in the suttas to the effect that a person acts, and then reaps the consequences. These statements are made to rebut the various theories circulating among philosophers of the Buddha's time that denied the efficacy of moral action, attributing all change to fate; these were forms of determinism. The Buddha's statements are not metaphysical in nature, and do not imply an unchanging subject of experience. Instead, continuity is maintained not by positing an extraempirical entity such as a Self, but by a theory of causality.[20]

The Buddha criticized two main theories of moral responsibility; the doctrine that posited an unchanging Self as a subject, which came to be known as "atthikavāda", and the doctrine that did not do so, and instead denied moral responsibility, which came to be known as "natthikavāda". He rejected them both on empirical grounds.[20] The following interaction of the Buddha pertains to the latter theory: The Buddha was silent to the questions of the paribbajako (wandering ascetic) Vacchagotta of “Is there a self?” or “Is there not a self?” [SN.5:44,10]. When Ananda later asked about his silence, the Buddha said that to affirm or deny the existence of an eternal self would have sided with sectarian theories and have disturbed Vacchagotta even more. The early Suttas see even Annihilationism, which the Buddha equated with denial of a Self, as tied up with belief in a Self.[21] It is seen as arising due to conceiving a Self in some sort of relationship to the personality-factors. It is thus rooted in the 'I am' attitude; even the attitude 'I do not exist' arises from a preoccupation with 'I'.[10] The Buddha appealed to experience in his refutation of natthikavāda, saying: "To one who sees, with proper understanding, the arising of the things in the world, the belief in nonexistence would not occur."[20]

The Buddha was also careful not to allow an atthikavādin interpretation of his doctrine of causality. In response to the question from a man named Acela Kassapa as to whether or not suffering is self-caused, the Buddha gave a negative reply; "A person acts and the same person experiences [the result] — this, Kassapa, which you emphatically call 'suffering self-wrought', amounts to the eternalist theory." In responding in this way, the Buddha indicated the connection between the problem of personal identity and moral responsibility.[22]

This process-view of a person does not see personality as a chaotic flux, but as a law-governed moving pattern which only changes insofar as supporting conditions change. In spite of the changes taking place in a person, some character-patterns are repeated, even over many lives, before they are worn out or replaced by others in accordance with the law of dependent origination. The complex of conditions arises out of an interaction of those processes internal to a person's own stream of psychological processes, that is, past or present karma, with those from the external world. Some of the external conditions will in turn be influenced or generated by internal processes. Thus the person-process both changes and is changed by its environment.[23]

The principles of causality are key to the Buddha's teachings; they provide a vital perspective on his doctrine as a whole and show how to see it integrated positively in the causal relationships of the mental-physical factors of the experience of life. Causal relationships were detailed in the Buddha’s analysis of dependent origination and idappaccayata (lit. “This is founded on that”).

All processes are impermanent ... All processes are afflicted ... All phenomena are not ‘Self’; when this is seen with knowledge, one is freed from the illusion of affliction. This is the pathway to purity.

— Dhp. 20. 277 – 279

This analysis is applied to knowing the interplay of senses within the mental-physical factors just as they are. It is a careful analysis of these realities in terms of their changefulness, instability or un-satisfactoriness and that these lack inherent personal identification. And this leads to wisdom (prajña, pañña), cessation of craving (nirodha), and to liberation (nirvana) of the will/mind (citta).

The goal of the Buddhist contemplative is to develop freedom of the will/mind (citta) from entanglement with things as they seem; through the delusions of desire and consequential self-identity with events, resultant fear, aversion and projected hopes—to awaken to things as they are; coming home to a natural understanding of reality with one's given abilities at work in an ever changing evolution of experience. “The mind (citta) is cleansed of the five skandhas (pañcakkhandha)” [Nettippakarana 44]

Anatta in the Tathagatagarbha Sutras

Some Mahayana scriptures declare the existence of "atman," which in these scriptures is equated with buddha-nature.

Tathagatagarbha genre as orthodox

According to some scholars, the "tathagatagarbha"/Buddha nature discussed in some Mahayana sutras does not represent a substantial self (atman); rather, it is a positive language and expression of sunyata (emptiness) and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices.[24] It may be based on the phenomenon known as luminous mind in the Pali canon, discussed (somewhat circularly) in places such as the following in the Anguttara Nikaya:

Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is defiled by incoming defilements. Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements.[24][25]

Prior to the period of these scriptures, Mahayana metaphysics had been dominated by teachings on emptiness in the form of Madhyamaka philosophy. The language used by this approach is primarily negative, and the Tathagatagarbha genre of sutras can be seen as an attempt to state orthodox Buddhist teachings of dependent origination using positive language instead, to prevent people from being turned away from Buddhism by a false impression of nihilism. In these sutras the perfection of the wisdom of not-self is stated to be the true self; the ultimate goal of the path is then characterized using a range of positive language that had been used in Indian philosophy previously by essentialist philosophers, but which was now transmuted into a new Buddhist vocabulary to describe a being who has successfully completed the Buddhist path.[26]

In the Tathagatagarbha Sutra, the Buddha is portrayed telling of how, with his buddha-eye, he can actually see this hidden "jewel" within each and every being: "hidden within the kleśas [mental contaminants] of greed, desire, anger, and stupidity, there is seated augustly and unmovingly the Tathagata's [Buddha's] wisdom, the Tathagata's vision, and the Tathagata's body [...] all beings, though they find themselves with all sorts of kleśas, have a tathagatagarbha that is eternally unsullied, and replete with virtues no different from my own".[27] This represents a being's potential to become a Buddha; it is the "true self" in the sense of being the ideal personality, not a metaphysical essence. As the Buddha is portrayed as proclaiming in the Mahaparinirvana Sutra;

Good son, there are three ways of having: first, to have in the future, Secondly, to have at present, and thirdly, to have in the past. All sentient beings will have in future ages the most perfect enlightenment, i.e., the Buddha nature. All sentient beings have at present bonds of defilements, and do not now possess the thirty-two marks and eighty noble characteristics of the Buddha. All sentient beings had in past ages deeds leading to the elimination of defilements and so can now perceive the Buddha nature as their future goal. For such reasons, I always proclaim that all sentient beings have the Buddha nature.[24]

The Mahaparinirvana Sutra, a long and highly composite Mahayana scripture,[28] refers to the Buddha using the term "Self" in order to win over non-Buddhist ascetics.[29] From this, it continues: "The Buddha-nature is in fact not the self. For the sake of [guiding] sentient beings, I describe it as the self."[30]

The Ratnagotravibhaga, a related text, points out that the teaching of the tathagatagarbha is intended to win sentient beings over to abandoning "affection for one's self" - one of the five defects caused by non-Buddhist teaching. Youru Wang notes similar language in the Lankavatara Sutra, then writes: "Noticing this context is important. It will help us to avoid jumping to the conclusion that tathagatagarbha thought is simply another case of metaphysical imagination."[30]

Tathagatagarbha genre as monist

Not all scholars subscribe to the interpretation that the tathagatagarbha or 'Self' is not indicative of a monistic Absolute within the being. Some scholars do in fact detect leanings towards monism in these tathagatagarbha references. Writing on the diverse understandings of tathagatagarbha doctrine, Jamie Hubbard comments on how some scholars see a tendency towards monism in the tathagatagarbha texts [a tendency which Japanese scholar Matsumoto, however, castigates as un-Buddhist]:

'Matsumoto [calls] attention to the similarity between the extremely positive language and causal structure of enlightenment found in the tathagatagarbha literature and that of the substantial monism found in the atman/Brahman tradition. Matsumoto, of course, is not the only one to have noted this resemblance. Takasaki Jikido, for example, the preeminent scholar of the tathagatagarbha tradition, sees monism in the doctrine of the tathagatagarbha and the Mahayana in general ... Obermiller wedded this notion of a monistic Absolute to the tathagatagarbha literature in his translation and comments to the Ratnagotra, which he aptly subtitled “A Manual of Buddhist Monism” ... Lamotte and Frauwallner have seen the tathagatagarbha doctrine as diametrically opposed to the Madhyamika and representing something akin to the monism of the atman/Brahman strain ... Yet another camp, represented by Yamaguchi Susumu and his student Ogawa Ichijo, is able to understand tathagatagarbha thought without recourse to Vedic notions by putting it squarely within the Buddhist tradition of conditioned causality and emptiness, which, of course, explicitly rejects monism of any sort. Obviously, the question of the monist or absolutist nature of the tathagatagarbha and Buddha-nature traditions is complex.’[31]

Michael Zimmermann, a specialist on the Tathagatagarbha Sutra,[32] sees the notion of an unperishing and eternal self in that early buddha-nature scripture and insists that the compilers of the Tathagatagarbha Sutra 'do not hesitate to attribute an obviously substantialist notion to the buddha-nature of living beings'.[33] Zimmermann also avers that 'the existence of an eternal, imperishable self, that is, buddhahood, is definitely the basic point of the Tathagatagarbha Sutra'.[34] He further indicates that there is no evident interest found in this sutra in the idea of Emptiness (sunyata), saying: 'Throughout the whole Tathagatagarbha Sutra the term sunyata does not even appear once, nor does the general drift of the TGS somehow imply the notion of sunyata as its hidden foundation. On the contrary, the sutra uses very positive and substantialist terms to describe the nature of living beings.'.[35]

The problem of evil

With this monistic interpretation arises the problem of evil akin to the theistic problem of evil.[36] The Ratnagotra-vibhaga sees the tathagatagarbha as the basis for all mental activity, including "unsystematic attention", which is in turn the basis for moral and spiritual defilements. The Lankavatara Sutra specifically says that the tathagatagarbha "holds within it the cause for both good and evil." Tathagatagarbha thought, seeking to avoid the conclusion that genuine evil can arise from the pure tathagatagarbha, portrays mental defilements as insubstantial illusions produced by delusion.[36] It portrays mental defilements as unreal, and nirvana not as the actual extinction of anything, but as being already existent in a concealed state. Why the illusory mental defilements should be imagined by the deluded mind is stated to be a mystery that only a Buddha can understand.[37] The absolutist language of tathagatagarbha thought thus tends to introduce a gulf of non-relation between the realms of enlightenment and deluded existence. This dualism brings with it the conundrum of relating enlightened and unenlightened existence.[38]

Opposed to early Buddhism and Yogācāra

In early Buddhism, in contrast, nibbāna, which is Pāli for "blowing out", is the extinguishing of the three fires of greed, hatred, and delusion.[39] Furthermore, it is not the recognition of a pre-existing or eternal perfection, but is the attainment of something that is hitherto unattained.[40] This is also the orthodox Yogācāra position.[41] The early scriptures also reject monism (ekatta) and pluralism (nānatta) as speculative views.[42] See middle way.

Comparative studies: the "self" in Western philosophy

René Descartes

Western approaches to the self have various proponents. The most famous is perhaps René Descartes, who in “Meditations on first philosophy” drew the conclusion cogito ("I think therefore I am"). Descartes's aim was to find epistemological certainty (certainty in knowledge) and part of his project was to prove the existence of an immaterial soul. However, virtually all modern philosophers have noted that not only is Cartesian Dualism untenable since the interactionism problem breaks the causal closure of the physical, but the cogito itself is logically fallacious. As Nietzsche points out, it presupposes an “I” to think without offering empirical evidence to back this assumption. As It has also been pointed out that the only thing the cogito can tell us is that thinking entails existence and no more. John Cottingham stated the only thing the cogito tells us is that there is something thinking.

David Hume

David Hume in his 1739 “Treatise of Human Nature” concluded that he could not perceive a self.

'After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it? For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist' (Hume, 1739)[43]

Hume states that philosophers who argue for a self that can be found via reason are confusing "similarity" with "identity". Instead Hume invites us to introspect our experience and see if we can find a self within our experience. What we discover is that there are only perceptions and no self that we can find within our experience. This leads Hume to conclude:

'The identity ascribed to man is nothing more than a fiction' (Hume, 1739)

David Hume's "bundle theory of the self" is in some ways similar to the Buddha's skandha analysis, though the skandhas are not an ontological exercise, but rather an explanation of clinging.

Derek Parfit

Derek Parfit's reductionist account is also reminiscent of Buddhism. Parfit devotes a small appendix in his book Reasons and Persons to showing that "Buddha would have agreed" with his account.[44]

Other philophers

Other notable philosophers in the problem of selfhood or as it is technically known - personal identity – include Thomas Metzinger, Julian Baggini, Bernard Williams and Sam Harris. Neuroscientists and philosophers of conscious have started incorporating the notion that there is no self into current theory with Daniel Dennett being a well known advocate of this position in his theory of consciousness. Also incorporating this view into an account of awareness is James Giles. Re-interpreting Hume and the Buddhist view, he argues that what we take to be the self is nothing more than a constructed self-image.[45]

See also

Notes

  1. SN 35.74 (PTS)
  2. Nanavira Thera, Nibbana and Anatta. [1]. Early Writings -> Nibbana and Anatta -> Nibbana, Atta, and Anatta.
  3. SN 22.47 (PTS)
  4. "23. Rādhasamyutta". The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Samyutta Nikāya. Wisdom Publications. 2000. p. 987. ISBN 9780861713318.  |first1= missing |last1= in Authors list (help)
  5. "22. Khandhasamyutta". The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Samyutta Nikāya. Wisdom Publications. 2000. pp. 909–910. ISBN 9780861713318.  |first1= missing |last1= in Authors list (help)
  6. Damien Keown (2004-01-01). "ucchedavāda". Oxfordindex.oup.com. Retrieved 2013-12-04. 
  7. SN 12.17 (PTS)
  8. MN 2 (PTS)
  9. SN 22.81 (PTS)
  10. 10.0 10.1 Peter Harvey, The Selfless Mind. Curzon Press 1995, pages 39,40.
  11. 11.0 11.1 SN 12.12 (PTS)
  12. SN 12.35 (PTS)
  13. "The Diamond of Perfect Wisdom Sutra", "25. There Are No Beings to Liberate". Retrieved on 8 May 2014.
  14. "The Essence Of Mahayana Practice". Retrieved on 8 May 2014.
  15. Nan Huaijin. Basic Buddhism: Exploring Buddhism and Zen. York Beach: Samuel Weiser. 1997. p. 46.
  16. Nan Huaijin. Working Toward Enlightenment: The Cultivation of Practice. York Beach: Samuel Weiser. 1993. p. 139.
  17. Dependent-Arising and Emptiness (1989) pp. 67-150 ISBN 0-86171-057-6
  18. 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 Translations from "The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path of Enlightenment", Vol. 3 by Tsong-Kha-Pa, Snow Lion Publications ISBN 1-55939-166-9
  19. Peter Harvey, The Selfless Mind. Curzon Press 1995, page 33.
  20. 20.0 20.1 20.2 David Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, page 44.
  21. Peter Harvey, The Selfless Mind. Curzon Press 1995, page 39.
  22. David Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, page 13.
  23. Peter Harvey, The Selfless Mind. Curzon Press 1995, page 247.
  24. 24.0 24.1 24.2 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named zencomp.com
  25. See [2].
  26. Sallie B. King (1997),The Doctrine of Buddha Nature is Impeccably Buddhist. In: Jamie Hubbard (ed.), Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm Over Critical Buddhism, Univ of Hawaii Press 1997, pp. 174-192. ISBN 0824819497
  27. Lopez, 1995, p.96
  28. Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations.Taylor & Francis, 1989, page 98, see also page 99.
  29. Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations.Taylor & Francis, 1989, page 100. "... it refers to the Buddha using the term "Self" in order to win over non-Buddhist ascetics."
  30. 30.0 30.1 Youru Wang, Linguistic Strategies in Daoist Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism: The Other Way of Speaking. Routledge, 2003, page 58.
  31. Jamie Hubbard, Absolute Delusion, Perfect Buddhahood, University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu, 2001, pp. 99-100
  32. ^ http://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/Michael-Zimmermann.23.0.html?&L=1
  33. Zimmermann, Michael (2002), A Buddha Within: The Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, Biblotheca Philologica et Philosophica Buddhica VI, The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, Soka University, p. 64
  34. Michael Zimmermann, A Buddha Within, p. 64
  35. Zimmermann, A Buddha Within, p. 81
  36. 36.0 36.1 Peter Harvey, Buddhism. Continuum International Publishing Group, 2001, page 86.
  37. Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History, and Practices. Cambridge University Press, 1990 page 116.
  38. Jamie Hubbard, Absolute Delusion, Perfect Buddhahood: The Rise and Fall of a Chinese Heresy. University of Hawaii Press, 2001, page 101.
  39. Richard Gombrich, Theravada Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988, page 63: "Nibbana means 'blowing out.' What must be blown out is the triple fire of greed, hatred, and delusion."
  40. Kashi Nath Upadhyaya, Early Buddhism and the Bhagavadgita. Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1998, page 352.
  41. Dan Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology. Routledge, 2002, note 7 on page 154.
  42. David Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, page 88. The passage is SN 2.77.
  43. A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume
  44. Derek Parfit: Reasons and Persons, Appendix J, also see chapter 12 (section 92).
  45. James Giles: No Self to be Found: the Search for Personal Identity, University Press of America, 1997.


Bibliography

External links

  • Anatta: Non-Self Audio discussion of Anatta from Buddhist Society of Western Australia.
  • Nirvana Sutra English translation of the Nirvana Sutra by Kosho Yamamoto.


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